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This book examines Section 2:7 of the Netherlands Civil Code. Section2.T
contains a provision entitling a company - under certain circumstances - to
nullifl' an ultra vires transaction with a third party. The study not only in-
cludes the history of the law in this area but also compares the legal position
of several other European jurisdictions. The study concludes by recom-
mending that the Netherlands legislator infroduces unlimited capacity for
NV and BV companies vis à vis third parties.
First it analyses the sihration in England in chapters 2 through 5. England
can be seen as the nursery ofthe ultra vires doctrine: the theory that a regis-
tered company is unable to perform ulha vires transactions. As opposed to
the permission granted by the public authorify to act as a legal entity with
limited liability (concession theory), the contractual capacity of a company
was deemed to be limited by the contents of a company's object clause. In
the famous case Ashbury v. Riche (1875) the House of Lords declared the
ultra vires rule to be the law. This caused considerable criticism from the
business ector, because many believed that the legal security of third parties
had been sacriÍiced to protect company shareholders and creditors. In any
event, it led to the custom of very lengthy and extended object clauses in
memoranda of association.
The controversy between the judiciary and the business world about ultra
vires transactions then focussed on the interpretation rules: when to deem a
specific transaction to be within an object clause in a memorandum of asso-
ciation. An important question in extension thereof was whether a transac-
tion conflicting with the (financial) interest of a company should be deemed
to be ultra vires. Initially the judiciary did indeed apply this rule for a con-
siderable period. However, since 1970 (Charterbridge Corporation Ltd. v.
Lloyds Bank Ltd.) it withdrew from this position and ruled that the (finan-
cial) interest of a company should be distinguished from and not mixed up
with the subject of ultra vires transactions. Other restrictive interpretation
rules remained applicable, including the rule that an 'independent objects
clause' could not convert something which was intrinsically a power into an
object (Introductions Ltd. v. National Provincial Bank 1970).
While the courts were busy with these questions of interpretation, which
caused legal uncertainty and resulting criticism from the business world, the
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legislator entrenched the ultra vires doctrine by a remarkable path. The
Erlropean Communities Act of 1972 opted for the possibility granted in the
,.rond part of Section 9 paragraph I of the first EC Directive, maintaining
the ultrá vires rule to the exteni that it could be used against third parties who
acted in bad faith. However, due to the manner in which the English legisia-
tor implemented this provision, the ultra vires rule could remain in full force,
diverging from the literal text of the Directive while honoring its goal of
prot.Jtitig third parties. The formulation of the Act caused many differences
àf interpietation between the various authors. The existing legal uncertatnty,
resulting from the different interpretation rules described above, was there-
fore incieased by the manner of implementation of the first EC Directive'
partly as a resuli of criticism from the business world, the Companies Divi-
sion of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) decided in 1985 to ap-
point a review commission under the presidency of Professor Dan Prentice
to exumi.r" the legal and commercral consequences of the abolition of the
ultra vires rule.
The Prentice Report of 1986 contained numerous recommendations, includ-
ing that (i) the (external) capacity of a company should be unlimited' (ii)
wiih respect to private companies the mandatory obligation of an object
clause should be abolished and (iii) a public company could publish an an-
nual statement describing its prospective business activities in place of the
object clause, in fulfillmànt of the existing requirement based on the second
Eó Directive. In the revised Companies Act of 1989, the legislator accepted
the recommendation in (i) above. However, the manner in which this new
concept was codified led again to interpretation difficulties. As a result the
subject of the abolition of the ultra vires rule reappeared on the agenda of the
uroaa company Law Review in 1998 upon which DTI again reported. The
recommendation document (the consultation Document of 1999) not only
contains proposals to secure the uninterpretable abolition of the ultra vires
rule in oid.i to grant full capacity to companies to enter into transactions
with third parties, but also piopot., making the object clause optional for
private companies.
This study then tums to the history of the Dutch ultra vires doctrine in chap-
ters 6 through 9. Follorving the developments in England, the ultra vires
doctrine in the Netherlands É..u*. a subject of interest to authors at the end
of the nineteenth century. If the developments in the Netherlands were not
yet a copy of those in England, they remained at least quite similar over a
íong p"tió0. Tension also arose in the Netherlands between the severe ultra
vires rule and the wish to protect third parties who had acted in good faith'
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The legislator, obviously aware of the existence of the ultra vires doctrine,
nonetheless did not include a specific provision in that respect in its review
of the Code of Commerce in 1928. The judiciary attempted to Íill the gap,
honoring both points of departure: the applicability of the ultra vires rule and
the protection of third parties who did act in good faith. In first instance a
company was simply held liable when it had entered into an ultra vires trans-
action with a third party in good faith (the case of the Huiden-arrest of
1928). At a later stage the Supreme Court adopted the construction whereby
acts, which could have fallen under the object clause and which took place
under such circumstances that a third parfy, acting in good faith and with
reasonable care, could have assumed and was permitted to assume that those
acts were not ultra vires, were deemed to be part of the object clause. In
other words, in those circumstances these acts were not ultra vires (the case
De GruyterA/oorschotbank-arrest of | 9 42).
After the first EC Directive became applicable, the Netherlands legislator
followed the English methodology. In Section 36h of the Code of Com-
merce, introduced in 1971to comply with the directive, the legislator - as in
England - opted for a provision whereby the ultra vires rule could be main-
tained and whereby third parties in good faith were protected because trans-
actions with them were deemed to be part of the object clause. In those cir-
cumstances those acts were not ultra vires. A further similarify with the
English situation was that the codification of the ultra vires provision caused
a series of interpretation problems and led to legal uncertainty. This was not
remedied by subsequent changes, up to the current Section 2:7 Civil Code;
since Section 2:6 (old) the provision has been formulated in conformity with
the literal text of the first EC Directive. However, in two ways the Nether-
lands situation after 1970 deviated fundamentally from that in the UK.
In the first place, in our country, we have never engaged in broad discussion
about the desirability of abolition of the ultra vires rule as is heard in the UK.
Secondly, unlike in the UK, Dutch authors and the judiciary have even after
1970 maintained the interpretation rule that an object clause must to a certain
extent be interpreted in respect of the (financial) interest of a company by the
respective transaction. The literature is divided upon how this interpretation
rule should be precisely defined. The judiciary has also failed to provide
clear guidelines in this respect. This situation adds further legal uncertainfy
to the existing problems of interpretation of the codification of the ultra vires
provision in Section 2:7 Civil Code.
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The shrdy explores the French situation, in chapter 10, which is similar to
that of the Netherlands (and the UK until 1989) to the extent that the legis-
lator has also adopted the exception to full abolition of the ultra vires rule
allowed in the first EC Directive, choosing to maintain the rule against third
parties who have acted in bad faith. Unlike in the Netherlands (or the UK),
ho*..r.., the ultra vires doctrine has led to little literature or case law in
France. One possible leason is that the French theory of corporate interest
has never been connected with the ultra vires doctrine, but has separate ar-
rangements. In French law, the theory of corporate interest is governed by
criminal law provisions.
Finally the German situation is discussed in chapter 1 1. Its most tmportant
characteristic was adopted in the main rule contained in Section 9 of the first
EC Directive: that the capacity of a company vis à vis third parties is not in
any respect limited by an object clause. In other words: a company has full
capacity to enter into transactions with third parties.
The conclusion in chapter 12 is that it would both improve the legal certainty
and harmonize our legal system with those of the uK and Germany, if the
Netherlands were to abolish the ultra vires rule with respect to NV and BV
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